Massachusetts Slip Opinions - Massachusetts Appellate Cases - Division of Property Cases in MA

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Massachusetts Appellate Cases / Divison of property

On this page we are compiling links to the full text of important Massachusetts Appellate Cases on Family Law and Divorce decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts Appeals Court.

These cases are for educational purpose only and should not be used for any official or legal purpose. Please consult official reports. Below you will be able to search for Massachusetts Appeals Court Slip Opinions and Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Slip Opinions relating to Division of Property.

 

Division of Property Cases in Massachusetts

 

Abegglen v. Abegglen The parties' separation agreement provided that the husband establish an estate plan to leave one-third of his estate in trust to the wife. The wife was afraid that one-third of his estate would not be available to her and she filed a civil action against her husband for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and later filed a motion to add a breach of fiduciary duty. The court found that the husband was not in breach of contract because anticipatory breach is not recognized in Massachusetts, and there were no facts to support the wife's claim for the breach of convenant of good faith and fair dealing. The wife's motion was denied because a fiduciary relationship did not exist between the parties.

Adlakha v. Adlakha The parties were married in 1984, and the husband was employed as a nuclear engineer and the wife was a physician. For the majority of the marriage, the parties lived separately. Although the parties had some joint investment assets their finances were kept separate. In 1995, the husband voluntarily stopped working as a nuclear engineer and opened a jewlery kiosk. Since that time, the husband was underemployed, which the court later found. During this time, the wife's medical practice prospered. The court split the parties' assets in proportion to their contributions to the marriage. The proportional split of the marital estate was based on the factors set forth in G.L. c. 208, section 34, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion on the issue of property division.

Baccanti v. Morton: (2001) Leading Massachusetts case on the treatment of Stock Options in Divorce.

Belsky v. Belsky 9 Mass. App. 852 (1980)-Future inheritance can be taken into account when dividing assets in divorce.

Bianco v. Bianco 371 Mass. 420 (1976) Early case interpreting MGL Ch. 208 section 34 relating to division of assets.

Dalessio v. Dalessio 409 Mass. 821(1991) Case involving division of proceeds of personal injury claims in divorce.

Dewan v. Dewan 17 Mass. App. Ct. 97(1983)—leading case on dividing pensions.

D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass.App.Ct. 488 (2004). The Huband’s interests in certain trusts were property excluded from the marital estate subject to property division pursuant to G.L.c. 208, § 34, and the Husband’s income from the trusts were treated as streams of income to establish alimony and child support orders.

Drapek v. Drapek: 399 Mass. 240 (1987). A spouse’s professional degree is not considered a marital asset subject to property division under G.L. c. 208, § 34. However, the spouse’s earning potential is considered when ordering alimony and property division.

Early v. State Board of Retirement 420 Mass. 836. Public Employment, Retirement. Retirement. Divorce and Separation, Division of property.

Gonzalez v. Pierce-Williams Petition filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on April 27, 2005.

Hanify v. Hanify 403 Mass 184(1988) Pending lawsuits are marital assets and can be divided by a divorce judgment.

Kuban v. Kuban 48 Mass.App.Ct. 387 (1999). The wife was not entitled to contributions made to the husband's retirement annuities, which were made by the husband's employer after the effective date of the dissolutions of the parties' marriage.

Mahoney v. Mahoney In a post divorce civil complaint, the husband alleged that the wife failed to buy out the husband's one-half share of the marital home by June 30, 2003. The wife filed a motion to dismiss stating that the husband did not have a claim under the law. The wife also attached a quitclaim deed dated March 21, 2002 and a canceled check for $16,000 from the wife to the husband dated April 13, 2002 to her motion. At a hearing the facts were heavily disputed; however, there was no evidentiary hearing because the trial judge took the case under advisement. The only evidence before the court were the attachments to the wife's motion. Consequently, the judge held the wife in contempt and denied her motion to dismiss. The wife appealed. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the wife's motion to dismiss because of the factual dispute but vacated the contempt judgment and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the case.

Moriarty v. Stone: 41 Mass.App.Ct. 151 (1996). The parties co-habited for ten (10) years prior to their marriage, and it was no error by the judge to consider their pre-marital contributions when determining an equitable division under G.L.c. 208, § 34.

Putnam v. Putnam 5 Mass. App. Ct. 10(1977) Division of assets may not be justified purely by bad conduct by one of the parties. All factors under 208 Section 34 must be considered.

Rice v. Rice: 372 Mass. 398, 400 (1977). A party’s estate is defined as “all property to which he holds title, however, acquired.” This allows a judge to assign “to one spouse property of the other whenever and however acquired.”

Salten v. Ackerman The husband appealed a divorce judgment pertaining to the property division (88% of the marital assets were awarded to the wife) and child support (husband was ordered to pay $2,000 per week). This was a 36 year marriage and both parties were attorneys, and worked outside of the home. The parties adopted a child and they agreed with the birth mother that the wife would become a full-time mother after the adoption. The husband earned approximately $400,000 per year as an attorney. The husband became involved with investments in Lithuania and Russia, which proved to financially disastrous to the marital estate. The husband used his own money as well as money from joint accounts, trust funds and his daughter's college savings, which was done without the wife's knowledge. Upon her finding out the wife made an effort to salvage what was left of the marital estate, and rebuild their financial security. During this time the husband took a leave of absence from his law firm, and he was eventualy not allowed to come back. The wife eventually filed a complaint for divorce. The court found that the husband lost $1.7 million. The court awarded the wife the majority of the marital assets because of the husband's reckless dissipation of the marital estate without her knowledge. The court found that the husband was not credible. The court considered the factors in c. 208, sec. 34, and an equitable division of property, and did not abuse its discretion. The judgment of divorce was affirmed.

Savides v. Savides: 400 Mass. 250 (1987). After a lengthy separation, it was appropriate for the Court to value the marital assets at the date of separation because the spouse made no further financial contributions to the marriage.

Taverna v. Pizzi - On April 3, 1995, the parties were granted a judgment of divorce nisi on their joint petition for divorce. The parties’ separation agreement was incorporated but not merged in the judgment of divorce. Three days after the divorce became final the wife gave birth to a girl. On February 6, 1996, the wife filed a complaint to establish paternity and child support against the husband. The probate judge dismissed the wife’s complaint, and transferred the matter under the original divorce docket. The probate judge modified the divorce judgment and ordered the following: 1) sole legal and physical custody of the child to the wife; 2) child support to be paid by the husband; 3) the husband was required to obtain a life insurance policy naming the child as the beneficiary; 4) the husband shall establish a college fund for the child, and upon turning 23, the child shall receive the remaining balance of the fund; 5) the husband shall convey 50% of his 401K plan to the wife; and 6) the husband shall pay retroactive child support in the amount of $50,000. The husband appealed. The modified judgment was affirmed with the exception of giving the remaining balance of the college fund to the child, and the 50% conveyance of the husband’s 401K account to the wife. The probate judge’s concern was proper in that the child should not have been treated as a child born out of wedlock because the child was born from a legitimate marriage, and the matter should not have been addressed under a complaint to establish paternity. Under the court’s general equity jurisdiction, the judge had the authority to order child support, retroactive child support and order the husband to obtain a life insurance policy to secure his child support obligation. The distribution of the remaining balance of the college fund was an assignment of marital property to a child, which is impermissible, and should be vacated. Lastly, the wife is not entitled to 50% of the husband’s 401K because the parties’ separation agreement was not merged into the judgment of divorce, and was a final division of marital property. Furthermore, the wife did not present evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or otherwise to warrant a modification of the separation agreement.

Williams v. Massa: (2000) Leading Case on Inherited property

 

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