Massachusetts Appellate Cases / Alimony
On this page we are compiling links to the full text of important Massachusetts Appellate Cases on Family Law and Divorce decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts Appeals Court.
These cases are for educational purpose only and should not be used for any official or legal purpose. Please consult official reports. Below you will be able to search for Massachusetts Appeals Court Slip Opinions and Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Slip Opinions relating to Alimony.
Alimony Cases in Massachusetts
Andrews v. Andrews A Probate Court judge treated the husband's military pension as a source of alimony, rather than as a capital asset to be divided equitably between the parties due to the uncertainty of the wife's medical needs.
Barron v. Puzo A complaint for modification seeking an order for payment of alimony,
filed approximately fourteen and one-half years after a former husband's
final payment of alimony under a decree of divorce, did not survive the
husband's death and should have been dismissed on the motion of the
administrator of his estate.
Bernier vs Bernier This appeal by Judith E. Bernier (wife) from decisions of a judge in the Probate and Family Court incident to her divorce from Stephen A. Bernier (husband) presents us with the novel question whether it is proper to discount the value of an S corporation, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1379 (2000), by "tax affecting" income at the rate applicable for C corporations, where one spouse will receive ownership of all shares of the S corporation after the divorce and the other will be required to relinquish all ownership in the business. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 311, 312 (2000). Also presented by the wife's appeal are whether the judge erred in discounting the fair market value of the S corporations at issue here by applying "key man" and "marketability" discounts; whether the amount of alimony awarded to the wife was proper; and whether the judge improperly dismissed the wife's equity complaint against the husband alleging misuse of marital assets.
Bertocchi vs. Ross Of 24 orders, the wife appeals from five, a restriction on the alimony award; the allocation of the marital assets; the assignment to her of responsibility for the children's private school tuition; an authorization for the husband to secure payment of alimony and child support obligations by a taxable retirement death benefit; and the failure to award reimbursement of her counsel fees and costs of the divorce litigation.
Britton v. Britton (May 11, 2007): After trial, the husband appealed certain parts of the divorce judgment regarding the failure to enforce an agreement to sell the marital home, and the "irrational alimony figure" he was ordered to pay. Prior to trial, the parties signed a hand-written agreement to sell the marital home; however, it was never entered as an order of the court. In addition, during trial, neither party sought to present their agreement to the court as an agreement intended to survive the divorce judgment. Furthermore, the language of the agreement appeared "to require some futher agreement of the parties or action at trial to incorporate it in the the judgment." Thus, since the agreement was not presented to the judge as an agreement to survive the divorce judgment the judge was not required to enforce the agreement. With respect to the alimony order, at the judge's discretion, he relied on the factors set forth in M.G.L.A. c. 208, sec. 34 in making a determination of alimony. From the record, there was no abuse of discretion on the judge's part. The divorce judgment was affirmed.
Cherrington v. Cherrington
Cohan v. Feuer 442 Mass. 151, (2004) The general rule is that the payment of alimony terminates when the obligor spouse dies or the obligee remarries, “unless either (1) the original decree on agreement provides otherwise or the parties legally amend their agreement to provide otherwise, or (2) in the case of the obligor’s death, the court makes written findings establishing that termination of the award would work a substantial injustice because of facts not present in most cases.
Cooper v. Cooper, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 130 (2004). A judge’s finding did support its order to modify alimony in excess of the terms of the original divorce judgment. Thus; its judgment was vacated as to the alimony order that was in excess of the original divorce judgment, unless a judge found that “the husband’s income was of such magnitude as to be well in excess of adjustments to income reasonably anticipated by the parties’ separation agreement and that the agreement’s provisions for support and property were inadequate to maintain the wife in the standard of living enjoyed by the parties while married.”
Daugherty vs. Daugherty At the 1995 trial of a postdivorce complaint for property division and alimony, the judge should have awarded the wife her share, plus the subsequent market appreciation of that share, of the husband's pension and profit sharing fund based on its value in 1995, when the parties separated and the marital partnership effectively ended. In a post divorce proceeding for alimony, the judge did not abuse his discretion in the amount of the alimony award.
D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass.App.Ct. 488 (2004). Based on the circumstances in this case, it was an error to limit the duration of the Wife’s alimony award, as her future income from employment was uncertain and her expected inheritence was too indefinite in time.
Downey v. Downey In an action for modification of a judgment of divorce nisi, the judge awarded alimony to the former wife, taking into account the fact that the loss of child support income upon the emancipation of the divorced couple's youngest child constituted a material change of circumstances, and also considered the history of the proceedings and other relevant circumstances of the parties. He concluded that the wife's resources were not sufficient for her support. The judge ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees, where the judge considered all relevant factors, including the husband's obstructionist conduct which prolonged the proceedings and caused the wife's counsel to engage in extraordinary discovery efforts.
Dwight v. Dwight In an action on a complaint for alimony the judge was correct in awarding the wife $2,600 per month alimony under the terms of a separation agreement incorporated in a judgment of divorce but surviving and having independent legal significance.
Flannery v. Flannery A claim for alimony payments under a support agreement against the estate of the deceased former husband more than five years after his death but before the estate was fully administered, was barred by the one-year limitations period set forth in G. L. c. 197, s. 9 (a), with respect to payments that accrued during the one-year period after the former husband's death, but not with respect to payments that accrued thereafter.
Goldman v. Goldman 28 Mass App. Ct. 603 (1990.) Court disapproved a trial court order of eight years of alimony in a 20 year marriage.
Gordon v. Gordon
Gottsegen v. Gottsegen 397 Mass. 617(1986.) Important case on the issue of enforceability of co-habitation clauses terminating alimony.
Greenberg v. Greenberg Complaint for divorce filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on July 24, 1992. Neither the findings nor the uncontroverted evidence support the conclusion that there was a change in the parties' circumstances justifying a downward modification in Frederic's alimony obligation. Frederic's request for double costs and attorney's fees related to this appeal is denied. Grubert v. Grubert: 20 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 819 (1985). When awarding alimony to a spouse, the “need” of a spouse is determined by “the ‘station’ of the parties --- by what is required to maintain a standard of living comparable to the one enjoyed during the marriage.”
Harris v. Harris Appeal from a modification judgment ordering that the husband's alimony obligation continues at specific rates until it is eliminated. The wife claims that the husband failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating that the parties have experienced a material change in their circumstances, let alone a "more than a material change" standard (Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510 , 515 [1982]), which she argues was required to warrant a modification of the divorce judgment. She also argues that the court made erroneous findings of fact and failed to consider all of the factors set forth in G. L. c. 208, Section 34, prior to entering the modification judgment.
Heins v. Ledis Discussion of the authority of a Probate and Family Court judge to award alimony and to make an equitable division of marital property. Also discussion of the distinctions between the concepts of alimony and property division. A probate judge incorrectly awarded alimony to the wife in part to reimburse the wife for her lost investment in the husband's business, and the award was improper without a determination of the wife's financial need or her potential earning capacity.
Heistand v. Heistand Case involving alimony and support payments for three minor children.
Huddleston v. Huddleston: The parties were divorced in 1978, and their separation agreement was incorporated and merged into the judgment of divorce nisi. The parties' separation agreement stated that the husband would pay the wife "during the joint lives of the parties" or until the wife remarried. The separation agreement also made provisions for annual cost of living increases/adjustments. After the divorce the husband remarried but the wife did not. The parties' judgment of divorce was modified in 1985 and 1991. The former wife appeals from a 1998 modification judgment wherein the court terminated the former husband's alimony payments upon either party's death, the former wife's remarriage or the former husband turning 65 years old. In addition, the probate judge eliminated the husband's obligation to carry life insurance on his life and the cost of living adjustment. The appeals court reversed the trial court because the judgment was contrary to the parties' intent that the husband pay the wife alimony regardless of his age or retirement status. Furthermore, based on the terms of the parties' separation agreement, there are no findings that state the former husband's alimony payment of $3,385.34/month was unduly burdensome to him or that the cost-of-living adjustments should be eliminated. Based on the facts of this case, there were no material change in circumstances in which a modification was warranted.
Katz v. Katz In a proceeding for modification of alimony, the Probate Court judge abused her discretion terminating the husband's alimony obligation without appropriate consideration of all the relevant circumstances. The evidence established the existence of assets that were available to the husband to pay some level of support without impoverishing him. The record established that is the wife did not receive any alimony she would be reduced to poverty.
Kehoe v. Kehoe Case involving an award of alimony. The probate judge inquired carefully into the then current financial
circumstances of the parties.
Keller v. O Brien (1995) Discussion involving the termination of alimony in the case of remarriage. Remarriage does not automatically terminate alimony, but rather requires a court to terminate alimony unless the recipient spouse demonstrates extraordinary circumstances warranting its continuation. Husband´s alimony was terminated.
Keller v. O´Brian (1997) Postjudgment divorce proceeding where a the husband was not entitled to restitution of alimony payments made to the wife after her remarriage where it would be inequitable in the circumstances; the court determined that the rule announced in Keller v. O'Brien, 420 Mass. 820 (1995), would not be applied retroactively to this case. LYNCH, J., dissenting.
Kelley v. Kelley Complaint for divorce filed in the Norfolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on May 7, 1999. The portions of the judgment dated November 28, 2003, that reduce the alimony award to the wife and deny her request for attorney's and expert's fees and costs in connection with the proceedings below are reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Probate Court for a determination of the amount of those fees and costs. The wife has requested her attorney's fees and costs in connection with this appeal. She "may . . . submit [her] petition for [appellate] fees together with the necessary back-up material and details as to hours spent, precise nature of the work, and fees requested," Yorke Mgmt. v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 20 (1989), to this court within fifteen days of the issuance of the rescript in this case. See Larson v. Larson, 28 Mass. App. Ct. at 343, 344.
Kernan v. Morse (June 20, 2007): The parties were divorced in 1999. There were two children of the marriage. At the time of the divorce, the husband was earning approximately $300,000 , and the wife was a fulltime homemaker and primary caretaker of the children. Although the wife did not work, she was receiving unearned annual income of approximately $83,000 from family trusts. Under the divorce judgment, the parties shared joint legal custody, and the wife had primary physical custody of the daughter and the husband had primary physical custoday of the son. The husband was ordered to pay the wife $500 per week in child support and $500 per week in alimony. In 2003, the husband filed a complaint for modification to reduce his support because he had lost his job in 2002 (his only source of income was unemployment, even though the value of his assets increased), and his daughter resided equally with the parties. In addition, the wife's unearned annual income from family trusts increased to $123,026, and the value of her assets increased, too. The wife filed a motion for summary judgment and an affidavit of undisputed facts, stating that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. The wife's motion was allowed by the judge, and the husband's complaint for modification was dismissed. The husband appealed. The judge erred when he only considered the husband's "technical ability to pay" without consideration of the changed circumstances regarding wife's need for support. There is a triable issue regarding the wife's need for continued support from the husband because of her increase in income and assets, and fact that the daughter is residing equally with the parties. These circumstances, together with the husband's financial circumstances, are all relevant, and must be considered together. This judgment was reversed and remanded back to the probate court.
Larson v. Larson An alimony provision in a separation agreement survived the judgment of divorce with independent significance. The husband must pay a percentage of his earned income as alimony and must also provide a reasonable amount of alimony. The husband had decided on his own to retire in good health from a successful career some years before his normal retirement age and thus stopped earning income, without having made some other provision for his former wife's support.
Lynch v. Lynch 5 Mass. Appt. Ct. 167(1977.) Marital conduct cannot be the primary determinant of the amount of alimony.
Mansur v. Clark A Probate Court judge correctly dismissed a wife's complaint for contempt alleging that her former husband had failed to meet his alimony obligation, where the husband's obligation to pay alimony arose exclusively from the parties' separation agreement and was not the subject of a court order. The Probate Court judge correctly dismissed a husband's complaint seeking modification of his alimony obligation where, in the absence of any court order relative to alimony, the husband's effort to achieve modification was directed to the alimony obligation imposed by the parties' separation agreement itself.
O´Brien v. O´Brien A former wife was seeking modification of a support order entered against a former husband. She was receiving public assistance and since the husband was capable of contributing to her support, the judge correctly concluded that he should award support to the wife against the husband only to the extent necessary to remove her from public assistance; moreover, the judge's order concerning the husband's payment of uninsured medical expenses of the wife was reasonable, and the amount of attorney's fees awarded after a hearing was properly within the judge's discretion. On appeal from dismissal of a claim for support made by a former wife against the second of her three former husbands. The second husband's obligation to support his former wife ended when she married her third husband was a correct application of the general principle governing this case that, when a successor spouse is financially able to support the former recipient spouse, the former payor spouse is not obliged to contribute support payments (in the absence of an agreement to the contrary).
Parrish v. Parrish In the circumstances of this court's remand of a divorce action for a new trial on the issue of a change in the support obligation owed by the husband, the judgment dismissing the wife's counterclaim was also reversed and the question of the payment of additional attorney's fees to the wife was also remanded for reconsideration. The judge properly dismissed a complaint for contempt seeking to compel payment for certain expenses that were not part of the support obligation ordered by the court.
Pierce v. Pierce Review of the evolution of the law of alimony, which is wholly statutory, and discussion of the factors that a judge must take into consideration in making an award of alimony (or a modification of an award) and the balance that a judge must strike when financial resources are inadequate to maintain the marital standard of living.
Rosenberg v. Rosenberg 33 Mass. App. Ct. 903(1992) In high asset case, involving a long term marriage, the wife received $4,000,000 in cash and other assets equivalent to approximately 30 percent of a marital estate worth $22,000,000. The court approved a judgment awarding $2000 per week alimony in addition to this property settlement.
Rosenblatt v. Rosenblatt 39 Mass. App. Ct. 297 (1995) – Court upheld prenuptial agreement as to division of assets, but still awarded alimony, despite waiver in prenuptial agreement. Sampson v. Sampson, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 366 (2004). The alimony award was vacated and the issue of property division was remanded for reconsideration because the probate judge’s order left the wife in “economically strained circumstances while [the husband was] guaranteed continued enjoyment of the secure, comfortable marital lifestyle.”
Schillander v. Schillander Alimony case involving a probate Court that had no jurisdiction of a petition by a divorced husband to modify the provisions for payments by him to his former wife contained in a valid contract.
Thomsen v. Thomsen 12 Mass. Appt. Ct 1010 (1981)—Alimony award which included cost of living increase was permissible.
Wooters v. Wooters Alimony case where the husband appeals from portions of a divorce judgment.
TOP |
