Massachusetts Slip Opinions - Massachusetts Appellate Cases - Alimony Cases in Massachusetts

Britton v. Britton (May 11, 2007): After trial, the husband appealed certain parts of the divorce judgment regarding the failure to enforce an agreement to sell the marital home, and the "irrational alimony figure" he was ordered to pay. Prior to trial, the parties signed a hand-written agreement to sell the marital home; however, it was never entered as an order of the court. In addition, during trial, neither party sought to present their agreement to the court as an agreement intended to survive the divorce judgment. Furthermore, the language of the agreement appeared "to require some futher agreement of the parties or action at trial to incorporate it in the the judgment." Thus, since the agreement was not presented to the judge as an agreement to survive the divorce judgment the judge was not required to enforce the agreement. With respect to the alimony order, at the judge's discretion, he relied on the factors set forth in M.G.L.A. c. 208, sec. 34 in making a determination of alimony. From the record, there was no abuse of discretion on the judge's part. The divorce judgment was affirmed.

Cohan v. Feuer 442 Mass. 151, (2004) The general rule is that the payment of alimony terminates when the obligor spouse dies or the obligee remarries, “unless either (1) the original decree on agreement provides otherwise or the parties legally amend their agreement to provide otherwise, or (2) in the case of the obligor’s death, the court makes written findings establishing that termination of the award would work a substantial injustice because of facts not present in most cases.

Cooper v. Cooper, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 130 (2004). A judge’s finding did support its order to modify alimony in excess of the terms of the original divorce judgment. Thus; its judgment was vacated as to the alimony order that was in excess of the original divorce judgment, unless a judge found that “the husband’s income was of such magnitude as to be well in excess of adjustments to income reasonably anticipated by the parties’ separation agreement and that the agreement’s provisions for support and property were inadequate to maintain the wife in the standard of living enjoyed by the parties while married.”

D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass.App.Ct. 488 (2004). Based on the circumstances in this case, it was an error to limit the duration of the Wife’s alimony award, as her future income from employment was uncertain and her expected inheritence was too indefinite in time.

Goldman v. Goldman 28 Mass App. Ct. 603 (1990.) Court disapproved a trial court order of eight years of alimony in a 20 year marriage.

Gottsegen v. Gottsegen 397 Mass. 617(1986.) Important case on the issue of enforceability of co-habitation clauses terminating alimony.

Greenberg v. Greenberg Complaint for divorce filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on July 24, 1992. Neither the findings nor the uncontroverted evidence support the conclusion that there was a change in the parties' circumstances justifying a downward modification in Frederic's alimony obligation. Frederic's request for double costs and attorney's fees related to this appeal is denied.

Grubert v. Grubert: 20 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 819 (1985). When awarding alimony to a spouse, the “need” of a spouse is determined by “the ‘station’ of the parties --- by what is required to maintain a standard of living comparable to the one enjoyed during the marriage.”

Huddleston v. Huddleston: The parties were divorced in 1978, and their separation agreement was incorporated and merged into the judgment of divorce nisi. The parties' separation agreement stated that the husband would pay the wife "during the joint lives of the parties" or until the wife remarried. The separation agreement also made provisions for annual cost of living increases/adjustments. After the divorce the husband remarried but the wife did not. The parties' judgment of divorce was modified in 1985 and 1991. The former wife appeals from a 1998 modification judgment wherein the court terminated the former husband's alimony payments upon either party's death, the former wife's remarriage or the former husband turning 65 years old. In addition, the probate judge eliminated the husband's obligation to carry life insurance on his life and the cost of living adjustment. The appeals court reversed the trial court because the judgment was contrary to the parties' intent that the husband pay the wife alimony regardless of his age or retirement status. Furthermore, based on the terms of the parties' separation agreement, there are no findings that state the former husband's alimony payment of $3,385.34/month was unduly burdensome to him or that the cost-of-living adjustments should be eliminated. Based on the facts of this case, there were no material change in circumstances in which a modification was warranted.

Kelley v. Kelley Complaint for divorce filed in the Norfolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on May 7, 1999. The portions of the judgment dated November 28, 2003, that reduce the alimony award to the wife and deny her request for attorney's and expert's fees and costs in connection with the proceedings below are reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Probate Court for a determination of the amount of those fees and costs. The wife has requested her attorney's fees and costs in connection with this appeal. She "may . . . submit [her] petition for [appellate] fees together with the necessary back-up material and details as to hours spent, precise nature of the work, and fees requested," Yorke Mgmt. v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 20 (1989), to this court within fifteen days of the issuance of the rescript in this case. See Larson v. Larson, 28 Mass. App. Ct. at 343, 344.

Kernan v. Morse (June 20, 2007): The parties were divorced in 1999. There were two children of the marriage. At the time of the divorce, the husband was earning approximately $300,000 , and the wife was a fulltime homemaker and primary caretaker of the children. Although the wife did not work, she was receiving unearned annual income of approximately $83,000 from family trusts. Under the divorce judgment, the parties shared joint legal custody, and the wife had primary physical custody of the daughter and the husband had primary physical custoday of the son. The husband was ordered to pay the wife $500 per week in child support and $500 per week in alimony. In 2003, the husband filed a complaint for modification to reduce his support because he had lost his job in 2002 (his only source of income was unemployment, even though the value of his assets increased), and his daughter resided equally with the parties. In addition, the wife's unearned annual income from family trusts increased to $123,026, and the value of her assets increased, too. The wife filed a motion for summary judgment and an affidavit of undisputed facts, stating that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. The wife's motion was allowed by the judge, and the husband's complaint for modification was dismissed. The husband appealed. The judge erred when he only considered the husband's "technical ability to pay" without consideration of the changed circumstances regarding wife's need for support. There is a triable issue regarding the wife's need for continued support from the husband because of her increase in income and assets, and fact that the daughter is residing equally with the parties. These circumstances, together with the husband's financial circumstances, are all relevant, and must be considered together. This judgment was reversed and remanded back to the probate court.

Lynch v. Lynch 5 Mass. Appt. Ct. 167(1977.) Marital conduct cannot be the primary determinant of the amount of alimony.

Rosenberg v. Rosenberg 33 Mass. App. Ct. 903(1992) In high asset case, involving a long term marriage, the wife received $4,000,000 in cash and other assets equivalent to approximately 30 percent of a marital estate worth $22,000,000. The court approved a judgment awarding $2000 per week alimony in addition to this property settlement.

Rosenblatt v. Rosenblatt 39 Mass. App. Ct. 297 (1995) – Court upheld prenuptial agreement as to division of assets, but still awarded alimony, despite waiver in prenuptial agreement.

Sampson v. Sampson, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 366 (2004). The alimony award was vacated and the issue of property division was remanded for reconsideration because the probate judge’s order left the wife in “economically strained circumstances while [the husband was] guaranteed continued enjoyment of the secure, comfortable marital lifestyle.”

Thomsen v. Thomsen 12 Mass. Appt. Ct 1010 (1981)—Alimony award which included cost of living increase was permissible.

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